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Back to Basics 
There is a continuous tension in most religious traditions between those who accept 
only the pristine elements of faith as imparted by the founders, often in holy writings, 
as the basis for religious belief and practices and those who temper the original mes-
sage, and consequently modify their beliefs'and practices, in the light of later wisdom 
and custom. In the last twenty years we have seen a resurgence of interest in, and 
growth among, the conservative elements in several of the main religious traditions. 
Colin Brown tell us in theoretical terms the distinguishing features of a Christian fun-
damentalist. A more empirical approach by John Knight identifies the New Religious 
Right in Australia. Peter Riddell shares the insights he has gained from several visits 
to Iran of the practical influences on that society of a fundamentalist Islamic faith. 
MartinKatchen looks at the resurgence of Jewish fundamentalism. Two books are re-
viewed for those who may wish to delve further into the field. 
Witness or Dialogue? 
Christian Funda~entalists at Bay 
"' Colin Brown 
University of Canterbury, N.Z. 
Since 1967 I have been responsible for 
teaching about Christianity in one of our 
introductory survey courses. Almost 
every year, during enrolment week, at 
least one student calls on me to discuss 
my presentation of this material. It soon 
transpires that the questioner is a Chris-
tian fundamentalist, sometimes an Asian 
converted by European missionaries, and 
words like 'sound', 'biblically-based', 
and 'genuine Christianity' spatter the in-
quiry. Usually no real dialogue takes 
place and such interviews are frustrating 
for both parties. 
This article, then, emerges from con-
tacts with Christian fundamentalists in 
university and church contexts over some 
years: in addition, for five years now I 
have taught a course on Fundamentalism 
at B.A.(Hons) level. My main question is 
this: what is there about the 'character' of 
Christian fundamentalism which might 
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help to explain the absence of genuine dia-
logue in contexts such as that mentioned? 
In this area there is room for psycho-
logical considerations but, for two rea-
sons, I have not drawn on these. I have no 
real expertise in this area and, moreover, 
what impresses me is what happens to per-
sons who are drawn into or emerge from 
fundamentalist circles. Thus my focus of 
concern in this article is on aspects of fun-
damentalism that shape and sustain atti.-
tudes which inhibit dialogue. 
But the term 'fundamentalism' itself 
raises problems. Within the limits of a 
brief article all I can do is to indicate what 
I have in mind when I write about Chris-
tian fundamentalism. It seems to me that 
the matter of definition in such cases is 
best approached utilising Wittgenstein' s 
clue that definitions are a matter of 'fam-
ily resemblances' and not a search for elu-
sive essences. Thus, when I talk about 
Christian fundamentalism, I have in mind 
features including insistence on biblical 
inerrancy; strong affirmations about a 
range of doctrines including the virgin 
birth of Christ, his miracles, substitution-
ary atonement, bodily resurrection and his 
imminent second coming; the equation of 
Christianity with the fundamentalist ver-
sion of it; separatism variously interpreted 
and a militant attitude towards move-
ments like 'liberalism', 'modernism', and 
'secular humanism'. 
The revivalist heritage of fundamental-
ism helps to ensure that an experience of 
conversion, sometimes emotional and dra-
matic in character, often marks entry to 
fundamentalism. In addition such ex peri-
ences are often linked with young per-
sons' search for independence and 
identity. Sometimes, too, the conversion 
experience initiates deliverance from an 
acutely felt sense of disorder and mean-
inglessness or from the destructive forces 
Volume Five, Number 1 
of drug dependence or criminal proclivi-
ties. 
Especially in the early stages of post-
conversion experience, where the new 
identity is still a fragile construction, the 
sense of deliverance - even of bliss - is 
powerful, and yet immersion in the details 
of the fundamentalist world-view is in-
complete, fundamentalists resist very vig-
orously any challenges to their new-found 
identity and salvation. Thus any discus-
sion of religious issues with such persons 
is much more than a 'merely' intellectual 
matter. 
But as converts continue in the funda-
mentalist way a further shaping factor 
plays its part. The historical study of fun-
damentalism has made very clear the im-
portant role that networks of institutions 
have played in nurturing and sustaining 
fundamentalists. Moreover such institu-
tions tend to have a 'totalistic' character 
in their variety, range, and exclusion of 
other points of view except as targets for 
criticism. 
In this connection a recent and impor-
tant development has been the rise of 
'Christian schools', quite prominent and 
expanding in the United States and ap-
pearing in other countries also including 
New Zealand and Australia. Such schools 
vary in character and their divorce from 
the surrounding culture is not and cannot 
be total. Nevertheless it seems clear that 
in such matters as library censorship and 
classroom practice the free discussion of 
views other than the fundamentalist is se-
verely inhibited. Even in the upper levels 
of such schools students do not really en-
gage in dialogue with a variety of views 
and those who hold them. The general 
stance taken is to affirm one particular 
view as correct, as identical with truth 
with a capital 'T', and not to accord to 
other opinions either equal time or equal 
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treaunent The preparation offered by 
such schools is not such, therefore, as to 
prepare students to engage in dialogue in 
a pluralist context and to accord genuine 
respect to the views of others. (Of course 
fundamentalists are not the only offenders 
in such respects: there are some intolerant 
'"radicals and liberals too.) 
Even tertiary study does not always 
change this state of affairs depending, per-
haps, on the type of study engaged in. 
One 'hunch' worth investigating is that 
fundamentalism among university stu-
dents seems more likely to be found 
among those in commerce, engineering 
and medicine than among those in arts 
courses. If this is true, why is it the case? 
There is no doubt that belief in biblical 
inerrancy lies at the heart of the funda-
mentalist outlook. This is regarded as the 
essential bedrock of certainty by funda-
mentalists and the Bible as the basic 
guide for individual and society. Uncer-
tainty is removed by abolishing the 'her-
meneutical gap' between text and · 
interpreter. Moreover, within the funda-
mentalist community the Bible functions 
as the central, tangible, sacramental ob-
ject, a counterpart to the Sacred Host of 
the Body of Christ in traditional Catholi-
cism. 
For the fundamentalist the Bible pro-
vides a se~es of non-negotiable assertions 
and, because the distinction between text 
and interpretation is effaced or ignored, 
the claim of inerrancy and infallibility 
spills over into fundamentalist claims gen-
erally. All this is inhibiting to genuine dia-
logue which involves readiness to grant 
that one's views, interpretations, or even 
the highest authorities on which one is re-
lying, may be in error. The fundamental-
ist simply will not trade away biblical 
inerrancy and, in a sense, is right to take 
this line. Belief in biblical inerrancy is 
fundamental for fundamentalists. 
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There are other characteristics of the 
fundamentalist outlook, some related · 
closely to the basic notion of biblical iner-
rancy, and all with a tendency to inhibit 
genuine dialogue with those of differing 
views. Clearly it will not do to label all 
fundamentalists as 'anti-intellectual'; the 
term itself is problematical and figures 
such as J.G.Machen always get cited as 
counter..:examples in this context, and 
what about the creationists with, in some 
cases, their Ph.D.s? Nevertheless some 
fundamentalists are anti -intellectual in 
outlook and, over the years, fundamental-
ists have often countered me with texts 
such as: 'Beware lest any man spoil you 
through philosophy and vain deceit, after 
the tradition of men, after the rudiments 
of this world and not after Christ.' ( Colos-
sians 2:8) 
But even the more intellectually in-
clined among fundamentalists are inhib-
ited by their epistemology which, 
historically speaking, derives from Scot-
tish Common Sense Realism. Clearly it is 
too much to claim that every fundamental-
ist comes to discussion impregnated by 
this particular philosophical outlook but, 
in broader terms, it is this epistemological 
position which prevails in fundamentalist 
circles whether its historical origins are 
recognised or not. 
(This particular epistemology operates 
with a pre-Kantian paradigm of knowl-
edge, sets great store by 'facts' and com-
monsense, disparages the theoretical 
component in knowledge ('Evolution is 
just a theory' is a stock -phrase where fun-
damentalists are concerned), and holds 
that clear answers on all manner of ques-
tions are available to the 'pure in heart'. 
Thus, as George Marsden and others have 
pointed out, the fundamentalist is ill-
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equipped to enter into discussion of rival 
interpretations of, say the evidence for the 
resurrection of Christ, or to face up to plu-
ralism of belief generally. The epistemol-
ogy of fundamentalism leaves little room 
for manoeuvre and some fundamentalists, 
when pressed tend to attribute what they 
regard as error to moral perversity, to the 
fact that those from whom they differ are 
'sinners' in ways that the latter do not dis-
cern. 
Buttressed by belief in biblical iner-
rancy and an inflexible epistemological 
outlook, fundamentalists tend to insist 
that only in their circles, is the authority 
of the Bible properly respected and Chris-
tianity correctly understood. Accordingly, 
within fundamentalist institutions little at.:. 
tempt is made to inculcate sympathetic in-
sight into other varieties of Christianity 
since, with some qualifications (conserva-
tive Evangelical Protestants being a par-
tial exception and 'anonymous' 
fundamentalists ), other expressions of 
Christianity are simply not Christianity. 
Thus J.G. Machen in his Christianity and 
Liberalism denied the designation 'Chris-
tianity' to modernism and liberalism with 
that courtesy and rigidi,ty which were his 
hallmarks. ' 
Closely related is the po~t that funda-
mentalism is very much a party in opposi-
tion. It will not do to characterise it as 
out-and-out anti-modem since in some re-
spects, fundamentalists have adapted to 
modernity, a fact which partly explains 
their survival and success. But they are 
militant and strongly so against what they 
see as the values of modernity, their own 
exclusion from socio-political power, and 
what they regard as the intellectual he-
gemony of godless 'secular humanism' 
and its close kin 'Christian' liberalism 
and modernism. Thus Nancy Ammennan 
entitles one of the chapters in Bible Be-
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lievers, 'Warriors against Modernity'. 
This crusading mentality is not conducive 
to meaningful dialogue but is strongly en-
couraged in fundamentalist circles. It is 
aided, too, by what Hofstadter and Mars-
den have called the 'Manichean' outlook 
(world history seen as a straight-out con-
flict between truth and error, good and 
evil), the penchant for conspiracy theories 
and a tendency to demonise opponents. 
These characteristics go closely with 
the point that whether in the 1920s or to-
day fundamentalists are seized with a 
sense of cultural crisis coloured and 
heightened by the lurid clouds of apoca-
lyptic eschatology. It is no time, there-
fore, for the free exchange of ideas about 
religious matters and to canvass, say, 
problems relating to the historical evi-
dence for the resurrection of Christ. This 
is often regarded by fundamentalists as a 
diversionary tactic, a case of fiddling 
while Rome bums and souls yearn for the 
message of the everlasting gospel. What 
is needed, therefore, is an all-out evangel-
istic campaign and not discussion about 
the content of the message let alone con-
versation with those of non-Christian 
faiths, or of no religious faith at all. 
These then are the main factors which, 
in my view, shape and sustain the funda-
mentalist outlook and inhibit dialogue. 
The preCise mix and importance of such 
causes will, of course, vary from person 
to person, and group to group. But the 
overall effect is to nurture Christians who 
are incapacitated for dialogue and for full 
participation in_ the invigorating life of a 
religious! y pluralist society. 
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Australian Fundamentalism and the New Right 
John Knight and David Chant 
Department of Education 
University of Queensland 
Abstract 
Drawing on a 1986 empirical study of 
Australian social attitudes, this paper ex-
amines the possible articulation of r~lig­
ious fundamentalism with New Right 
views. Religious fundamentalism is seen 
to offer a potential constituency for an 
Australian New Christian Right. 
Introduction 
This paper draws on the Smith, Knight 
and Maxwell (1986) suiVey of Australian 
social attitudes to examine the possible ar-
ticulation of religious fundamentalism 
with New Right views in Australia. It 
seeks to ascertain the degree to which fun-
damentalism offers a potential political 
constituency to the New Christian Right, 
who that constituency might be, and what 
the implications might be. 
Terms such as 'New Right' are of 
course difficult to pin"down. While it is 
generally acknowledged that the New 
Right is not a monolithic phenomenon, its 
definition continues to be disputed. Thus 
it has been narrowly defined (eg, Green, 
1987) as sharing the tradition of 'western 
classical liberalism', while broader defini-
tions include 'free market devotees, liber-
tarian political thinkers, moral 
conseiVatives, religious fundamentalists 
and biological detenninists' (Sawer, 
1982:vili). Wexler and Grabiner 
(1986:11) offer a useful systematisation 
of these groupings. They describe two 
groups 'in the current rightward reaction'. 
One group has an economic focus; its con-
cerns are with 'the free market', small 
government, and so forth. It is the eco-
nomic New Right. The other group is 
more concerned with social and cultural 
issues (eg, the nation, the family, religion 
and morality) from a conseiVative per-
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spective. Its focus is on 'cultural restora-
tion'. For this study of the possible asso-
ciation of fundamentalist views with 
social and cultural conservatism, and 
New Right economics, Wexler and 
Grabiner's classification seems most ap-
propriate. 
We begin by noting the obvious. 
There is no necessary connection between 
fundamentalism, consexvatism, and the 
economic New Right. They may be ami-
nority, but there are religious fundamen-
talists who reject consexvatism, 
capitalism, and all their works. Nor do re-
ligious concerns form a necessary ele-
ment of the growth of the New Right (cf. 
Chandler, 1984). Hence the manifesta-
tions of social consexvatism and the eco-
nomiC New Right will differ, for 
. example, in the U.S., Australia and the 
U.K. Thus church attendance and relig-
ious affiliation have traditionally been 
high in the U.S. and low in the U.K., 
while Australia remains in an intermedi-
ate position. Similarly, while Moral Ma-
jority type groups and Political Action 
Committees were prominent in the U.S. 
in the early 1980s, groups such as the Fes-
tival of Light seemed n;J.UCh less effective 
in the U.K., and in the Australian situ-
ation (except in Queensland under Bjelke-
Petersen) single-issue groups ( eg, 
anti-abortion, pro-censorship) attracted 
more support than fundamentalist lobbies. 
Much has been made of the similarities 
between Thatcherism and Reaganism. 
Some attention could well be paid to their 
differences (including the religious eie-
ment). In short, the manifestations of the 
New Right will vary from country to 
country, and across time also. 
That said, given the political promi-
nence and apparent success of fundamen-
talist and 'Moral Majority' type lobbies in 
the U.S. in the Reagan era, a brief review 
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of the U.S. situation might provide a point 
of departure for an examination of the 
Australian situation. -
The U.S. Situation 
The existence and effects of what 
Liebman and Wuthnow (1983) termed the 
'New Christian Right' in the U.S. have 
been researched in detail. The general 
conclusion is that there was a religious 
New Right which had significant (though 
not overwhelming) political clout. 
Thus Johnson and Tamney (1985) 
found that the main support for the Moral 
Majority came from two groupings: 
'authoritarian Christian rightists' who 
wanted to maintain and restore traditional 
Christian practices and values; and those 
who watched a lot of religious television. 
However, while Christian rightism played 
a modest role in Reagan's success, 'politi-
cal party identity and economic well-be-
ing' were far more important. In their 
view, religious beliefs and values have 
more influence on 'the private rather than 
the public realm'. 
On the other hand, Simpson (1985) 
claims that 'by successfully politicising 
socio-moral issues', Moral Majority type 
groups allowed Reagan to 'identify with 
the closely-held personal moral values of 
the majority of Americans and to engage 
in a politics of morality'. Similarly, 
Miller and Wattenberg (1984) found that 
support for Moral Majority type groups 
reflected 'a politicised extension of relig-
ious beliefs', so that support for consexva-
tive policy positions on social issues 
increased linearly with religiosity. Relig-
ious attitudes related much more weakly, 
however, to consexvative views on eco-
nomic and foreign policy issues. Against 
the conventional wisdom, consexvative 
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Christians were 'not predominantly less 
well-educated, elderly, lower-class, or 
Southern'. 
Shupe and Heinennan (1985) noted 
the strategic political alliance of Moral 
Majority and fundamentalist groupings 
with the John Birch Society and the Mor-
mon dominated Freemen Institute. Simi-
larly, Zwier and Smith (1980), Liebman 
(1983) and Latus (1983) addressed the 
range, strategies and affectivity of Moral 
Majority type lobbies and Political Action 
Committees. In that context, Moore and 
Whitt (1986) argued against 'a single ad-
ditive scale across conservative issues', 
showing that 'distinct coalitions fonn on 
specific issues'. 
Significantly, whatever measures and 
criteria are used, studies generally agree 
that the support for the New Religious 
Right during this period was generally 
low (eg, 4%-12%). There is also general 
agreement on the types of issues on the 
New Christian Right's agenda: issues 
around public schools ( eg, voluntary 
prayer, creationism and evolution, sex 
education), abortion, atheism, secular hu-
manism, communism, the Equal Rights 
Amendment, pornography, homosexual-
ity, drugs, gun control, military defence, 
free enterprise, the welfare state, and so 
on. 
In short, the New Christian Right in 
the U.S. articulated the discourse of mo-
rality, cultural restoratiop., the family, re-
ligion and social integration with the 
discourse of monetarism, the market, indi-
vidual freedom and the rejection of the 
welfare state. There is, however, no easy 
identification of ideology with class 
groupings. Finally, while fundamentalism 
as a social movement is certainly not a 
new phenomenon, and its influence in 
that period may have been over-rated, it 
constituted a political force with special-
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ised and well-funded lobbies, skilled in 
the use of the media in mobilising voters 
and constructing interest group coalitions. 
Given that fundamentalism has been a 
continuing phenomenon in the U.S. 
scene, the question is why it became a po-
litical force in the 1980s. Typically, expla-
nations have been phrased in terms of 
status politics or cultural fundamentalism. 
In the fonner, the New Christian Right is 
the reaction of the socially or economi-
cally dispossessed (cf. Gusfield, 1966; 
Lipset & Raab, 1978). In the latter (cf. 
Liebman & Wuthnow, 1983; Wood & 
Hughes, 1984), the fundamentalist world-
view provides the dynamic for action~ An 
alternative position of interest group poli-
tics (eg, Lienesch, 1982) notes the impor-
tance of cadre leadership to mobilise 
discontent, whether status or cultural, and 
to harness populist issues and diverse con-
stituencies for their own concerns. 
Australia also saw a rightward swing 
in politics and economic policy during the 
1980s. During this time fundamentalist 
type religious groups experienced consid-
erable growth in numbers. Yet efforts ( eg, 
Rona Joyner's STOP/CARE lobby, the 
Call to Australia Party, the League of 
Rights) to harness fundamentalist con-
cerns to right-wing political ends have 
not, thus far, been very successful. Why 
is this so? 
The 'What Australians Think' 
Survey 
In early 1986 a 43 item mail-out ques-
tionnaire (Smith, Knight and Maxwell, 
1986) was conducted across the three 
mainland eastern Australian states. The 
sample (3000) was randomly drawn from 
electoral rolls. Respondents were advised 
that their views were sought on a range of 
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Table 1. Five Dimensions on a New Right Agenda 
Response (%) 
P/0 Agree Don't Disagree 
Kriow 
I.THE TRADITIONAL AUSTRALIAN WAY OF LIFE UNDER THREAT 
1.We need a greater spirit of patriotism in Australia today. p 85.4 5.6 8.8 
2.Basic skills are not given enough attention in today's schools. p 84.0 5.9 10.1 
3.The traditional Australian way of life should be maintained. p 79.0 12.2 9.0 
4.Law and order are breaking down in our society. p 78.1 4.2 17.7 
5.Society will fall apart if traditional moral values decline. p 64.4 14.7 20.9 
6.Radical fringe groups pose a real threat to our way of life .. p 70.2 12.2 17.6 
7 .The unemployed could help themselves more than they do. p 81.7 9.1 9.2 
8.The family is being steadily undermined. p .72.7 9.1 18.2 
9.The present levels of Asian migration will not hann our country. 0 27.9 13.6 58.5 
IT. TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY LIFESTYLE AND 
STANDARDS 
l.The Bible is the best guide for living. p 51.8 16.2 32.0 
2.De facto relations are morally wrong. p 47.0 8.6 44.4 
3.Christian standards should be the basis of our whole way of life. p 68.5 8.8 22.7 
4.Christian schools are,better places to educate children. p 41.2 14.9 43.9 
5.Humanism and atheism are a danger to our society. p 38.6 22.3 39.1 
6. There should be strict laws against the personal use of marihuana. 'p 63.3 10.4 26.3 
7.Asl.5. p 64.4 14.7 20.9 
8.As 1.8. p 72.7 9.1 18.2 
9.Homosexuality between consenting adults should be legalised. p 33.0 10.1 56.9 
10.Restraints on x-rated l}lovies should be relaxed. 0 20.2 7.0 72.8 
11.Abortion should be a matter of personal choice. 0 76.9 3.7 19.5 
ill.A LIBERAL-PROGRESSIVE AGENDA (LIBPROG) 
l.Multiculturalism will divide Australian society. p 38.0 16.8 45.2 
2.Peace studies are dangerous propaganda. p 22.4 31.6 46.1 
3.The UN poses a threat to our free and democratic way of life. p 16.4 20.6 63.0 
4.Sex education should be taught in Australian schools. 0 81.5 6.4 12.1 
5.Asl.9. 0 27.9 13.6 58.5 
6.Aboriginalland rights campaigns ought to be supported. 0 29.8 15.7 54.6 
7.The feminist movement has been good for Australia. 0 42.3 21.2 36.5 
8.The World Council of Churches does good work. 0 52.1 32.7 15.1 
9.The conservation movement is right to seek greater protection 
of the environment. 0 66.4 8.7 24.9 
10.Altemative lifestyles should be tolerated in our society. 0 67.6 12.8 19.6 
Australian Religion Studies Review 
P/0 Agree Don't Disagree 
Know 
IV.ANGLO-DEPENDENT NATIONAL IDENTITY 
l.Australia should keep close ties with the Royal family. p 54.2 11.7 34.1 
2. We should uphold and preserve this nation's British heritage. p 52.8 11.8 35.4 
3.We should keep the Australian flag as it is. p 73.0 9.1 17.7 
4.Australia should become a republic. 0 21.0 18.0 60.9 
V.THE NEW-RIGHT ECONOMIC AGENDA 
l.Government agencies should be sold off to private enterprise. p 48.0 20.5 31.5 
2.Free enterprise is the key to Australia's economic success. p 82.2 10.8 7.0 
3. Trade Unions have too much power in Australia today. p 81.7 4.7 13.6 
4.Socialism is undesirable in Australia. p 63.4 16.1 20.5 
5.Wages and industry should be deregulated. p 33.3 25.7 41.0 
6. The size of government bureaucracy should be reduced. p 83.7 11.0 5.3 
7.Asffi.6. 0 29.8 15.7 54.6 
8.State aid should not be given to private schools. 0 39.7 7.1 53.2 
9.Australia's wealth should be equally shared. 0 32.8 11.1 56.1 
Polarity: P/0 indicates that the agenda Preferred position or the Oppositional posi-
tion lies to the left of our scales. Responses(%): The Likert categories 'Strongly 
Agree' and 'Agree' have been combined as 'Agree', while 'Disagree' and 'Strongly 
Disagree' have been combined as 'Disagree'. 
issues currently debated in Australian so-
ciety. The Likert-type items (see Table 1) 
on a five point scale from 'strongly agree' 
to 'strongly disagree' were drawn from 
material by a range of ideologues and 
right-wing groups and organisations sup-
porting the 1984 anti-Labor federal elec-
tion campaign. Demographic infonnation 
for each respondent was also obtained. 
There were 1680 replies of which 1486 
were useable for this analysis, the full re-
sults of which are reported in Knight, 
Smith and Chant (1989). A brief discus-
sion follows. 
The data contain five dimensions (see 
Table 1) obtained by principal factor 
analysis with varimax rotation. Dimen-
sions 1, 2 and 4 contain the kinds of life-
style and moral issues central to what 
might be called the cultural restoration 
movement. The representations are those 
of a mythical golden age of an Anglo-
Christian Australian society. Dimension 3 
specifies particular points of opposition to 
the welfare state and a liberal-progressive 
society. Dimension 5 contains the 'free 
market' agenda aimed at dismantling the 
welfare state and its policies. It provides a 
classic exposition of the agenda of the 
economic New Right. 
Confinnatory factor analysis indicates 
that while there is a general dimension to 
which (with one exception) all the items 
in Table 1 contribute, the five dimensions 
(factors) and their items have a continu-
ing identity. That is, there is a coherent 
identity consistent with a contrasting of 
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positions ('right' or 'conservative' and 
'liberal' or 'left') not only within, but 
across the five dimensions. In that situ-
ation, the combination of cultural restora-
tionism and New Right economics is 
generally dominant. At the same time, the 
five dimensions remain as separate enti-
ties within that configuration. That is to 
say, the data indicate the existence of an 
Australian New Right (incorporating cul-
tural restorationist and neo-liberal eco-
nomic views) whose agendas were widely 
known and acceptable to the majority of 
the sample. That given, the existence of 
an Australian New Christian Right can be 
investigated. 
The Australian New Christian Right 
So far as the New Right agenda was 
concerned, the demographic factor with 
most explanatory power was political alle-
giance, followed by religious affiliation, 
with lesser contributions from education, 
age, sex and occupation. The significance 
of party ideological factors is indicated in 
that National Party supporters were most 
supportive of the New Right in all dimen-
sions, followed always by Liberal Party 
voters. Supporters of the Australian Labor 
Party and (more strongly) the Australian 
Democrats tended to a more 'liberal/left' 
position. The main influence of religion 
was the split between Christians and non-
Christians, with the fonner being more 
likely to agree with the rightist position. 
At the same time, Christian respondents 
from other than the 'mainline' churches 
were generally most conservative on all 
dimensions. However, only at the polar 
positions did people possess clear-cut 
Right and Left characteristics. On dimen-
sion 1, for example, elderly Christians 
with low levels of education and conser-
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vative political allegiance contrasted with 
young non-Christian graduates with left 
political allegiance. 
Dimension 2 (Traditional Lifestyles 
and Standards) which addressed issues re-
lating to cultural restoration, and Dimen-
sion 5 (New Right Economic Agenda) 
were drawn on in testing for the linkage 
of religious fundamentalism with cultural 
restorationist views and market or New 
Right economic concerns. 
Given that fundamentalism is not sim-
ply a sectarian correlate but can be found 
also in mainline churches, an operational 
definition was sought from the items in 
Dimension 2, rather than the demographic 
variable, religious orientation. Dimension 
2 was used to define two contrasting 
groups: 'fundamentalist' or 'conservative 
Christian' and 'humanist' or those with a 
'secular' orientation. The four relevant 
items were: 
Christian standards should be the basis 
of our whole way of life. 
The Bible is the best guide for living. 
Christian schools are better places to edu-
cate children. 
Humanism and atheism are a danger to 
our society. 
Fundamentalism was arbitrarily de-
fined as 'strongly agreeing' or 'agreeing' 
with at least three of these four items. 
There were 601 respondents (or 40% of 
the sample) in this category. Humanism 
(348 respondents or 23%) was defined as 
the converse of this position. An intenne-
diate grouping (537 respondents; 36%) 
was alsq established. It should be evident 
that the results of this sort of definition, 
while certainly useful, are likely to be 
fairly coarse. 
The elements of dimension 5 (free en-
terprise, deregulation, privatisation, small 
government, anti-union, etc) provided the 
basis for defining an economic New 
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Table 2. Two scales cross-classified by the New Right v. Socialist Index, 'and 
the Fundamentalist v. Humanist Index. The upper panel contains frequencies, 
and the lower panel contains scale means. 
Traditional and contemporary The New Right Economic Agenda 
Lifestyle and Standards 
FUN INT HUM ALL FUN INT HUM ALL 
ER 287 167 86 540 287 167 86 540 
INT 310 364 247 921 310 364 247 921 
soc 4 6 15 25 4 6 15 25 
ALL 601 537 348 1486 601 537 348 1486 
ER 1.9 2.8 3.4 2.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.8 
INT 2.0 2.9 3.7 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.8 
soc 2.0 2.9 4.1 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.2 
ALL 2.0 2.9 3.6 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.4 
Abbreviations: (rows) ER - Economic Right, INT- Intermediate, SOC - Socialist, 
ALL - Overall results; (columns) FUN - Fundamentalist, INT - Intermediate, HUM -
Humanist, ALL - Overall results. 
Right group. This was arbitrarily defined 
as agreement or strong agreement with 
the New Right position on seven or more 
of the nine items, while a 'socialistic' po-
sition was defined as the converse of this. 
As before, an intermediate group re-
mained. 540 (36%) of the group were de-
fined as New Right, 921 (62%) were 
intermediate, and 25 (2%!) supported a 
'socialist' agenda. It should be evident, as 
with the fundamentalist vs. humanist in-
dex, that this is a relatively coarse index 
of the economic New Right. 
The upper panel of Table 2 indicates 
the intersection of the fundamentalist/ hu-
manist and New Right/socialist indexes. 
It can be seen that 287 (19%) of the total 
/ 
sample supported both fundamentalist 
and New Right views, while only 15 (1%) 
supported both humanist and socialist 
views. 
The lower panel of Table 2 shows the 
mean scores, using a five point rating -
from 'right' (1) to 'left' (5), on the Cui- · 
tural Restoration (Dimension 3) and New 
Right (Dimension 5) scales for the funda-
mentalist v. humanist index and the eco-
nomic right v. socialistic index. 
Fundamentalism is significantly more 
'right' than 'humanism' on both cultural 
restorationist issues and new right eco-
nomics, while the intermediate category 
remains intermediate on both dimensions. 
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The economic right is also seen to be sig-
nificantly more conservative on social is-
sues than the intermediate and socialistic 
groupings. Similarly, the combination fun-
damentalist/economic right is the most 
conservative on both groupings. 
It is worth noting that these differ-
ences also obtain on the other three origi-
nal dimensions. That is to say, 
fundamentalists are significantly and con-
sistently more conseiVative or 'rightist' in 
their support of the traditional Australian 
way of life, traditional lifestyles and 
standards, an Anglo-dependent national 
identity, rejection of the liberal-progres-
sive agenda, and the New Right economic 
agenda. we conclude that there is indeed 
an Australian New Christian Right and 
that fundamentalism is a significant con-
tributor to the Australian New Right. 
This study tends to confirm the re-
ceived wisdom on the demographic corre-
lates of fundamentalism. While females 
are slightly more likely to be fundamental-
ist and males are slightly more likely to 
be humanist, sex is not a significant dis-
criminant. Age, however, is a highly sig-
nificant discriminator, in that the 
proportion of fundaiD;entalists increases 
with age, while humanists are most pre-
dominant in the younger groupings. In 
education, fundamentalism is associated 
with lower levels of schooling, while hu-
manism is associated with higher levels 
(leaving certificate or degree). Fundamen-
talism is negatively correlated with in-
come, while humanists tend to receive 
above the average income. Occupation-
wise, humanists fall largely into the pro-
fessional/administrative categories while 
fundamentalists are most likely to fall 
into the farming sector. All of these differ-
ences are highly significant, statistically. 
Not surprisingly, Queensland has a higher 
proportion of fundamentalists than New 
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South Wales or Victoria, and fundamen-
talists are more likely to be found in rural 
than metropolitan areas. With respect to 
religious affiliation, however, 41% of fun-
damentalists were mainline Protestant or 
Anglican, 28% were Catholic, and 25% 
were Christian other, while humanists 
were 31% mainline Protestant/ Anglican, 
23% Catholic, 22% no religion and 15% · 
Christian other. In politics, fundamental-
ist preferences were liberal, 37%; Na-
tional Party, 34%; ALP, 21% and 
Democrats, 5%. Humanist preferences, 
however, were ALP, 34%; Liberal, 31 %; 
National Party, 24% and Democrats, 7%. 
The differences with respect to religion 
and politics were both highly significant. 
Discussion 
This analysis of the results of a 1986 
suiVey of Australian social attitudes indi-
cates that a significant section of respon-
dents (almost one in five) held views 
which might be described as New Chris-
tian Right. They would appear to hold 
views similar to lobbies such as Rona 
Joyner's still functioning STOP/CARE 
(Society to Outlaw Pornography and 
Committee Against Regressive Educa-
tion), the League of Rights or Fred Nile's 
Festival of Light. Their political commit-
ment was considerably (71 %) to the 
'right' and the Liberal-National Party coa-
lition. It may be that this was only be-
cause of the absence of more explicitly 
New Christian Right political parties. 
However, while the Call to Australia 
Party has been created in more recent 
times, it does not seem (as yet, at any 
rate) to have attracted New Christian 
Right supporters in sufficient numbers to 
give it anything more than a certain nui-
sance value. 
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This is perhaps explicable in terms of 
the discursive capacity of the two conser-
vative parties to articulate a cultural 
restorationist and economic New Right 
perspective which incorporates the views 
and values of many in the New Christian 
Right. (A more detailed discussion of · 
New Right discursive formations is found 
in Knight, Smith and Chant, 1989.) 
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Impressions of Fundamentalist Islam: Iran 
Observed 
Peter Riddell 
South and West Asia Centre 
F acuity of Asian Studies 
Australian National University 
The western media portrayal of life in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran during the 
decade of the 1980s, following the revolu-
tion of 1979, was very rarely favourable. 
An occasional observer of post-revolu-
tionary Iran could be forgiven for visualis-
ing a stereotype of a harsh regime which 
had as prime goals the clamping down on 
the local version of western pop sub-cul-
ture and the de-emancipation of women. 
Simply put, the Iranians have been por-
trayed for over a decade as the 'baddies' 
in several conflicts: the on-going tension 
with the United States; the surge in Is-
lamic fundamentalism throughout the 
muslim world which went hand-in-hand 
with what appeared to be an active Ira-
nian policy of exporting revolution; the 
Iran-Iraq conflict, during which the West 
saw Iraq as a buffer1against Iranian funda-
mentalist expansion; and the dispute with 
Britain over Salman Rushdie' s Satanic 
Verses. 
Not only did the image of Iran suffer, 
but the stereotype of Islam in general was 
badly affected by the various conflicts be-
tween Iran and the West. Iran was seen as 
the latter-day exponent of revivalist funda-
mentalist Islam, indeed the personifica-
tion of the Islamic faith, and its actions 
which aroused so much hostility in the 
West led directly to a rapid eroding of the 
perception of Islam throughout the West-
em world (Von Der Mehden 1983). 
Of considerable interest for our pur-
poses is the Iranian perception of the post 
1979 Islamic republic, and the claim that 
it is the first truly Islamic state to be estab-
lished since the community assembled by 
the Prophet Muhammad in 7th century 
Arabia (Bakhash 1990:8). This paper 1 
will focus on several significant features 
of contemporary Iran, placing them 
within an Islamic context, by reference to 
the Qur' fu1 and speeches and writings of 
-leading Iranian Islamic revolutionaries. 
Social Engineering 
Post-revolution Iran is characterised 
by a single-minded, normative approach 
to restructuring society. There is little 
room in modem-day Iran for the plural-
ism of the West. The significant differ-
ence between the West and Iran in terms 
of the varying attitudes to pluralism, is 
that in Western societies there is a separa-
tion between Church and State, whereas 
in post-revolution Iran religious values un-
. derpin the entire philosophy and structure 
of the State. In Western societies, there is 
no single supreme guardian of absolute 
values. Rather, relativism has become the 
order of the day, and Western democra-
cies place a high value on freedom of 
opinion, political persuasion and creed. In 
societies where religion is the formalised 
basis of the State, however, revealed 
scripture containing God's Word repre-
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sents an absolute set of values, which 
overrides any human value systems 
(which are perceived as being inherently 
flawed). This makes for a strong, central 
moral code, which because of the accep-
tance of absolutes in terms of beliefs and 
behaviour, absolves the society of the 
need to allow for relativist pluralism to a 
considerable degree. 
Thus, in an Islamic state, such as Iran, 
the ultimate point of reference for all mat-
ters, whether judicial, moral, ethical, or 
social, will be scripture: the Qur' ful, the 
Islamic Traditions of the Prophet, and the 
successive layers of Islamic literature 
built upon these two great sources. Any 
value system which is at variance with 
these sources is seen quite simply as be-
ing incompatible with God's Word, and 
thus wrong. There can be no room for the 
'each to their own' syndrome of the West, 
as there is logically no alternative, equally 
valid system to that given to humanity by 
God. This belief in the divine origin of Is-
lamic law is encapsulated in the teachings 
of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who said: 
Islamic government is the government of 
divine right, and its laws cannot be 
changed, modified, or contested. (Hendra 
1980:15) 
It is important in this context to under-
stand the impact that such pronounce-
ments by Khomeini had on Iranians. He 
was accorded unquestioned authority as 
the faqih or supreme jurist. As his spiri-
tual successor Ali Khamenei said in 1988, 
'When the supreme jurist issues an order 
based on the interests of Islam and the so-
ciety, that order is an order from God, a 
religious edict.' (Bakhash 1990:11) 
To reinforce the authority which he de-
rived from his position, Khomeini regu-
larly drew upon the authority of the 
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Qur'ful. This is the essence offundamen-
talistlslam: the recourse to revealed scrip-
. ture as the primary point of reference in 
setting the goals and patterns of contem-
porary society. An example to illustrate 
the issue of the divine origin of Islamic 
law discussed above is found in Qur' anic 
verses which encapsulate the uniqueness 
and absoluteness of Islam, such as: 
(Q3:109)You are the best of the nations 
raised up for (the benefit of) men; you en-
join what is right and forbid the wrong 
and believe in Allah; and if the followers 
of the Book had believed it would have 
been better for them; of them (some) are 
believers and most of them are transgres-
sors. 
( Q2: 143 )And thus We have made you a 
medium (just) nation that you may be the 
bearers of witness to the people ... 
Education in Iran has been used as an 
essential tool for social engineering since 
the earliest stages of the revolution. It was 
seen by the revolutionaries as having 
been an agent of negative values during 
the Shah's period of rule, and for two 
years in the early post-revolutionary pe-
riod, Iranian universities were closed 
down, to allow time to purge the institu-
tions of anti-revolutionary influences. But 
after this initial purification process, the 
universities have come to be seen as pro-
viding fertile ground for consolidating the 
revolution. This has had various manifes-
tations. Firstly, there is an ideological 
screening process which ensures that both 
academic and administrative staff in 
prominent positions are supporters of the 
Islamic government. Secondly, changes 
to school and university curricula have 
served to reinforce revolutionary ideals. 
For example, school curricula now in-
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elude a subject called Mor-
als. An Iranian acquaintance, 
who teaches Morals in 
schools, described it to me as 
one of the most important 
aims of the Iranian education 
system, which wants to 
change the behaviour of Ira-
nian children, owing to what 
he termed 'a crisis in social 
behaviour' .. He demonstrated 
a very fixed view of what is 
right and what is wrong, and 
a resolve to bring up a new 
breed of Iranians who will be 
attuned to absolute values, as 
are found in God's Law. 
The Moral Crusade 
One of the most striking 
features about contemporary 
Iran is the intense preoccupa-
tion of the authorities with es-
tablishing and maintaining a 
strict code of sexual moral-
ity. Once again, the refer-
ence point is the Qur' an, 
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which gives very clearm- A sign in an Iranian hotel reminding foreign women 
structions, both in relation to of the compulsory dress code. 
sexual conduct, and also in 
connection with dressing in 
an appropriately modest manner. The fol-
lowing verses demonstrate this: 
(Q24:30)Say to the believing men that 
they cast down their looks and guard 
their private parts,· that is purer for them; 
surely Allah is Aware of what they do. 
(Q24:3l)And say to the believing women 
that they cast down their looks and guard 
their private parts and not display their 
ornaments except what appears thereof, 
and let them wear their head-coverings 
over their bosoms, and not display their 
ornaments except to their husbands or 
their fathers, or the fathers of their hus-
bands ... 
(Q24:33)And let those who do not find 
the means to marry keep chaste until Al-
lah makes them free from want out of his 
grace. 
The cornerstone device for enforcing 
appropriate moral conduct is the hijab, 
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the female headcovering which is manda-
tory a.J¥'arel for every woman outside her 
home . It is the means to ensure that 
women do 'not display their ornaments' 
as referred to above. The role of the hijab 
in a nutshell is as follows: 
The philosophy behind the hijab for 
women in I slam is that she should cover 
her body in her associations with men 
whom she is not related to according to 
the Divine Law and that she does not 
flaunt and display herself. ( Mutahhari 
1987:12) 
To supplement the hijab covering, Ira-
nian women are forbidden to shake hands 
with men other than those in their immedi~ 
ate family, and devout Iranian women are 
trained to defer their.gaze when meeting 
men. The purpose is to prevent the tempta-
tion for men to leer at women with lustful 
looks, which is forbidden by Islam. 
The existence of clear Qur'anic injunc-
tions regarding moral behaviour, and the 
implementation of these injunctions in the 
Islamic legal code which predominates in 
Iran, raises the issue of the appropriate 
punishment for miscreants. Which of the 
nation's members are most guilty of ac-
tions which are contrary to the spirit of 
these injunctions, and how does the sys-
tem deal with law-breakers? 
These questions were put to a young 
member of academic staff, who was a spe-
cialist in criminology and who also wrote 
articles for youth magazines on subjects 
related to crime among the young. The in-
teiView went as follows: 
Q: Is crime a big problem amongst 
young people in Iran? 
A: Yes, it is very important in Iran. 
Q: What are the main crimes that young 
people engage in in Tehran? 
A: Crimes against property and sexual 
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crimes. These two categories are most im-
portant. 
Q: You mean rape? 
A: Rape in foreign countries is important, 
but in Iran, unlawful intercourse is a 
crime. Rape refers to relations between a 
man and a woman by force. In Iran, this 
is a crime, as are unlawful relations be-
tween a man and a woman (without use 
of force). 
Q: What is the punishment for an unlaw-
ful relationship between a man and a 
woman? 
A: If the man or woman is married, the 
punishment is death. Of course, to prove 
this crime is very difficult. If you look in 
the newspaper, you will have difficulty 
finding cases of this punishment, because 
proving it is very difficult. For example, 
there must be four witnesses to the act. 
They must completely see the act. 
If the man or woman who commits the 
crime is not married, they receive one 
hundred lashes. Proving this is also diffi-
cult. There must be witnesses or a confes-
sion. 
The punishments referred to above 
have been codified in the post-revolution-
ary Iranian legal system of civil law, with 
the details being drawn from the Qur' an 
(Q4: 15-16) and the Islamic Traditions. 
An example of this detail concerns the 
identity of the witnesses required in order 
to prove a charge of fornication: 
Article 91: Fornication is proved with the 
testimony of four reputable men, or three 
reputable men and two reputable women, 
whether it involves the punishment of 
flogging or the punishment of stoning to 
death. 
Article 92: In cases where fornication in-
volves only the punishment of flogging, it 
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is also proved with the testimony of two 
reputable men or four reputable women. 
NOTE: Testimony of women alone or 
jointly with that of one reputable man 
does not prove fornication; rather such 
witnesses shall be subject to the punish-
ment for slander. (Da 1wati 1984:150-151) 
During the 1980s, the precondition of 
there being witnesses to fornication for a 
verdict of guilty to be handed down was 
not always enforced. However, it appears 
that since early 1990,there has been some 
tightening up of the conditions for carry-
ing out punishment for moral crimes, and 
it is now increasingly necessary for the 
prescribed number of witnesses to be pro-
duced before the law can be carried out, 
as defined above. 
Minorities · Misfits of the Islamic 
Revolution 
What is the place of minorities in a so-
ciety with such a clearly defined set of so-
cial norms and absolute values? The issue 
of minority rights is addressed in Iran 
within the context rif the broader Islamic 
community. This is illustrated by the fol-
lowing comment by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini: 
The person who governs the Moslem com-
munity must always have its interests at 
heart and not his own. This is why Islam 
has put so many people to death: to safe-
guard the interests of the Moslem commu-
nity. Islam has obliterated many tribes 
because they were sources of corruption 
and harmful to the welfare of Moslems. 
(Hendra 1980:28) 
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The above statement illustrates a fun-
damental point about contemporary Iran; 
namely, that most minorities are able to 
function as distinct social and religious 
groups providing that they acknowledge 
the supremacy and authority of the Shiite 
Islamic government and do not threaten 
this authority in any way. To this end, 
various minority groups have repre-
sentatives within the Iranian parliament, 
and non-Islamic groups are free to prac-
tise their own forms of worship within 
certain limits 3. Nevertheless, such 'free-
dom within constraints' runs counter to 
thehumanspiritofindependence,and 
there is evidence of varying degrees of 
dissatisfaction among minority groups, 
whether social, political, or religious, who 
are out of step with the policies and per-
suasions of the Iranian authorities. 
A Kurdish informant expressed such 
disaffection in saying that although he 
was a Muslim, he was regarded with sus-
picion because he did not assume the out-
ward trappings of being a good 
revolutionary, such as regular attendance 
at the mosque, or remaining unshaven. 
Kurds complain of being subjected to on-
going, and sometimes violent, forms of 
.discrimination by fellow Iranians partly 
because of their being Sunni Muslims, 
whereas the majority of Iranians are Shi-
ites. It should be added that Kurdish resis-
tance groups, struggling for an 
independent Kurdish state, have greatly 
contributed to a continuing distrust of the 
Kurds by the Iranian government. Such 
an open challenge to the central Islamic 
authority usually precipitates a Govern-
ment clamp-down on what it perceives as 
a dissident group. 
A minority group to feel the full brunt 
of official disapproval is that of the 
Baha'is. Unlike the Kurds, who are ac-
cepted as muslims, the Baha'is are treated 
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with disdain, and regarded as being 
preachers of a false, infidel creed. Perse-
cution of this group has included confisca-
tion of property, denial of basic civil 
rights, physical abuse, and imprisonment 
and execution (Amnesty International Re-
port 1985:310). The fact that the Baha'i 
faith developed as an offshoot of Islam, 
and that the three central figures in its es-
tablishment are buried in a shrine in 
Haifa, Israel, has not assisted their cause 
in the eyes of the Iranian Government. 
The main Baha'i temple in Tehran has 
been closed down, and many Baha'is 
have left Iran since 1979 to settle in west-
em countries, including Australia. 
Jews are considered by Islam as 'Peo-
ple of the Book', and are thus accorded 
recognition as one of the official state re-
ligions, and are allowed to practise their 
faith providing they don't proselytise. 
Nevertheless, the frequent references to 
Jews in the Qur'ful are often highly criti-
cal, as was seen previously in the refer-
ence to 'the followers of the Book' in 
Q3: 109. Though not arousing the ire of 
the Iranian authorities to the same degree 
as the Baha'is, Jews have nevertheless ex-
perienced varying degrees of discrimina-
tion, including being denied opportunities 
for advancement in government service, 
denial of import/export licenses for Jew-
ish businessmen, and the withholding of 
various standard civic services from Jew-
ish neighbourhoods. There are also re-
ports of specially heavy-taxes being 
levied against Jews, as well as other meas-
ures, such as refusing to grant pennission 
for an entire family to travel out of Iran, 
thus detaining one member to ensure the 
return of the others. Some Iranian Jews 
have m(\llaged to leave Iran via Turkey, 
continuing on to Israel, where they have 
been accepted as new immigrants, joining 
a substantial community of ex-Iranian 
Jews now resident in Israel. 
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Thus, the official attitude to and treat-
ment of minorities is largely dependent 
on the degree to which those minorities 
show allegiance to the overall rule of Is-
lam. They enjoy a freedom with con-
straints and without a complete degree of 
equality. This is labelled discrimination in 
the West, but supporters of the Iranian 
government argue that the standard is 
sanctioned by Islam, so variants diverging 
from this Islamic standard are not deseiV-
ing of complete equality. 
Heroes of the Islamic Revolution 
Preceding discussion has focused 
upon issues and forces identified as poten-
tial or actual opponents of the Islamic 
state. However, the Islamic revolution has 
not been simply preoccupied with address-
ing negative factors in society. An essen-
tial agent of the fundamentalist revolution 
has been the depiction of goals of accept-
able Islamic behaviour. The most striking 
device for doing this is in the identifica-
tion of hero~s of the Islamic revolution 
for the benefit of the masses. 
The most frequently depicted personal-
ity is Imam Khomeini, the spiritual father 
of the revolution and leader until his 
death in June 1989. Representations of 
Khomeini are found on all manner of con-
structions, from small columns to large 
walls of multi-storey buildings. In addi-
tion, one will also see paintings of Imam 
Khomeini's successor as spiritual leader, 
Ali Khamenei, as well as representations 
of various heroes of the revolution and 
martyrs of the war against Iraq. 
Since 1979, many streets have been re-
named, and now carry the names of per-
sonalities held up as models of 
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revolutionary ideals. A notable example 
is Khaled Eslambouli Street, named after 
one of the assassins of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat. Eslambouli is regarded as a 
hero in Iran because, as a member of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brothethood, he was re-
sponsible for exacting revenge on Sadat 
for the latter's signing of the Camp David 
Peace accords with Israel in 1979. The 
post-revolution Iranian regime is implaca-
bly opposed to the existence of the State 
of Israel. It sees the establishment of the 
Jewish state on fonner Islamic-controlled 
land, and Israel's control over the Islamic 
holy site of Al-Aksa in Jerusalem, as run-
ning directly counter to the previously-dis-
cussed notion of Jewish communities 
being acceptable within dar al-Islam. 
only as long as they accept Islamic sover-
eignty. 
Many institutions carry the names of 
martyrs ofpost-revolut:i.-9nary Iran. An ex-
ample is Shahid Chamran University, 
named after a famous Iranian who spent 
several years in Lebanon assisting Leba-
nese Shiite forces in ·their struggles in the 
Lebanese Civil War, and who was eventu-
ally killed in the Iran-Iraq War. Another 
is Shabid Beheshtipniversity,'named af-
ter a prominent leader of the revolution 
and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
who was assassinated by Mojahedin re-
bels in June 1981. 
Perhaps one of the most prominent im-
pressions which strikes the visitor to Iran 
is the cult of martyrdom which has been 
developed and is reinforced in a myriad 
of ways. In addition to the numerous 
streets, buildings, and universities which 
carry the name of a shahid, or martyr, one 
cannot fail to constantly encounter slo-
gans, exhorting young Iranians to taste 
the glory of dying for Islam. Slogans such 
as 'Faith, Jihad, Martyrdom: the Only 
Way to Salvation' adorn both city walls 
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and billboards on country roads. Waiting 
rooms in government offices will often in-
clude a large picture poster of young· Shi-
ite revolutionary guards, with their 
characteristic red headbands 4, marching 
· ceremoniously on parade prior to embark-
ing for some distant conflict on the Iran-
Iraq border or in Lebanon. The ultimate 
goal seems to be admission to the Be-
hesht-e-Zahra, the martyrs cemetery in 
the southern suburbs of Tehran, where 
rows of martyrs' tombstones surround a 
large fountain which spews out bright red 
water, representing the blood of the mar-
tyred heroes. 
The common characteristic in the de-
piction of heroes of the revolution and 
models of good revolutionary behaviour 
is their commitment to the struggle 
against what are perceived as anti- Is-
lamic forces for evil. This struggle is de-
picted as a fundamental dichotomy 
between good, represented by Islamic val-
ues and teachings, and evil, represented 
by non-Islamic, secularist, materialist 
value systems. 
Whither Iran? 
The temptation is to look at recent de-
velopments in Iranian society through the 
eyes of a completely different, western 
culture, and to judge it negatively as a re-
sult. Indeed, the reverse could also apply, 
and a number of my Iranian acquain-
tances who are sympathetic to the revolu-
tion were highly critical of what they saw 
as the advanced state of decay of western 
society, manifested in the decline in mar-
riage, fewer people wanting children, ram-
pant drug problems, and a preoccupation 
with self-serving materialism. Just as this 
latter assessment of the West is raw and 
simplistic, it would not be appropriate to 
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evaluate post-revolutionary Iran out of 
context. Rather, it is necessary to see it as 
a product of the Iran which went before, 
which was characterised by enonnous so-
cial inequities and stark distinctions be-
tween the westemised elite and the less 
educated masses. In the revolution, the lat-
ter section of society finally found its 
voice, and the dramatic swing in the pen-
dulum has been a function of political and 
social developments this century and the 
conditions existing at the time of the revo-
lution. 
So whither Iran? The initial fundamen-
talist scripture-driven fervour and zeal of 
the 1980s has been tempered somewhat 
during 1990 and 1991 by more pragmatic 
factors, brought about by considerable so-
cial and economic dislocation resulting 
from both the revolution itself and the 
eight year long Iran-Iraq War. There 
seems little doubt that the radical changes 
brought about by the revolution, in tenns 
of social engineering based on Islamic 
values, will continue to be the predomi-
nant detennining factor in society for 
some time to come. But we are also likely 
to witness a gradual breakdown of the 
simplistic portrayal of the Western 'bo-
gey-man', which will coincide with a 
growing awareness on the part of Iran 
that it cannot quarantine itself from the 
West. Iran will continue to be the most dy-
namic force for change in the muslim 
world for some time to ·come, but its own 
increasing pragmatism will serve to add a 
degree of stability to current social and 
political trends throughout the muslim 
world. 
Notes 
1. The following pages cdescribe im-
pressions of Iran gathered during three 
visits which I made to Tehran between 
October 1990 and November 1991. 
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2. Very devout women will wear the hi-
jab even within the home. Less commit-
ted muslim women wear it in public as is 
obligatory, but discard it as soon as they 
withdraw to the privacy of their own 
homes. 
3. An example of such limits concerns 
the practice of Christian worship in Iran, 
where churches must avoid all references 
to Jesus as the 'Son of God' in their lit-
urgy. Such a reference is expressly forbid-
den at several places in the Qur' an, such 
as Q18:4-5 'And warn those who say: Al-
lah has taken a son. They have no knowl-
edge of it, nor had their fathers; a 
grievous word it is that comes out of their 
mouths, they speak nothing but a lie'. 
4. These bandannas are emblazoned 
with the ubiquitous Islamic exhortations, 
most commonly in the fonn of dedica-
tions to the Twelfth Imam, whose coming 
will inaugurate the reign of Truth and Jus-
tice, according to Shiite belief. 
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Jewish Fundamentalism 
Martin H. Kate hen 
Postgraduate University of Sydney 
At the end of World War II, an ob-
server in either Israel (then Palestine) or 
the United States, would have been hard 
put to see Orthodox or fundamentalist Ju-
daism as anything other than a living fos-
sil, soon to be superseded by more 
progressive fonns of Jewish observance. 
After all, Eastern Europe, the heartland of 
Orthodoxy had been almost totally annihi-
lated by the twin assaults of Communism 
and the Nazi Holocaust. Orthodox Juda-
ism had shown little talent to this point in 
surviving in the corrosive environment of 
North America, South Africa, or Austra-
lia, which unlike Eastern Europe, offered 
positive incentives for Jews who would 
moderate their observance in the interest 
of fitting in and getting ahead. Moreover, 
in Israel a new breed of nationalistic Jew, 
the sabra, was emerging, aggressive, 
proud of his or her Jewish heritage, but 
having little use for such restrictions as 
Sabbath, which appeared to be almost uni-
versally accepted as an outdated restric-
tion having little value in modem 
industrial society. · 
That fundamentalist Judaism has 
shown not only incredible staying power, 
but the ability to grow appears 
astonishing, but only to one who is not 
aware of similar trends in most other relig-
ions. Fundamentalist Judaism appears to 
be· following many of the same social and 
religious dynamics as fundamentalist 
Christianity, particularly in the United 
States and to a lesser extent, Australia. 
This article shall focus on these simi-
lar factors and how they contribute to the 
rise of American fundamentalist Judaism. 
Robert Wuthnow, Professor of Sociol-
ogy at Princeton University, has identi-
fied fundamentalism as essentially a 
response to modernity. Rather than being 
an authentic return to premodern folk pi-
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ety, fundamentalism is essentially an at-
tempt to update a religious tradition and 
to adjust and confonn to the fonns of 
modernity without accepting the sub-
stance of modernism. Fundamentalism 
identifies the priorities of the religious tra-
dition, the fundamentals which must be 
adhered to. Across religious traditions, 
these fundamentals appear to fall in 
roughly three categories, purity, pente-
costalism, and prophecy. 
Purity comprises the laws and nonns 
of the religious society. In Christianity, 
these include sexual mores such as prohi-
bitions on divorce and premarital and ex-
tramarital sex, as well as strictures against 
alcohol. In Islam most of these strictures 
are included in the Sharia or Muslim le-
gal system. In Judaism, these strictures 
(with the exception of the Christian prohi-
bition on divorce( not found in Islam 
either)) are included in the Mitzvot or 
commandments. 
Pentecostalism, besides referring to a 
specific Christian group of denomina-
. tions, refers to the acceptance and cultiva-
tion of states of religious euphoria or 
ecstasy. In Christianity, examples abound 
in the ecstatic singing and preaching asso-
ciated with pentecostal churches. In Juda-
ism, Chassidism has historically filled 
this role, as it does today. Ecstatic sing-
ing, dancing and often drinking at 
fahrbrengenen (the Lubavitch chassidic 
tenn for celebration) are quite common in 
Chassidic movements, and offer a major 
religious attraction. 
Prophecy is an emphasis on the fulfil-
ment of end times speculation. The need 
for fundamentalists to fit current events 
into an expected prophetic.framework is 
an aspect that appears to cross religious 
lines. In Shiite Islam, speculation on the 
revelation of the hidden Imam centred on 
the Ayatollah Khomeinei. In fundamental-
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ist Christianity, as is well known, specula-
tion has centred on the Book of Revela-
tions, with current events being 
interpreted in tenns of them. In Judaism, 
various sources have been quoted in at-
tempts to relate current events to the end 
times regarding the coming of Moshiach. 
Although the current Lubavitch specula-
tion is the most obvious example of this, 
it is not the only current example, as we 
shall see. 
This preoccupation with end times is 
both a manifestation of and a support for 
an attitude of pre millennia/ism. Premillen-
nialism can be defined as a belief that the 
world is in a relatively undesirable period 
in which evil is relatively triumphant. 
This period will be followed by a cataclys-
mic change which is the millennium, 
which will usher in a new and perfected 
world. 
Premillennialism is relatively common 
in religions. Hindus believe that we are in 
the dark Age of Kali. Shiite and Ismaili 
muslims await the coming of the hidden 
Imam. Fundamentalist Christians await 
the Second Coming of Jesus. And funda-
mentalist Jews await the coming of 
Moshiach. 
A premillennialist stance makes it pos-
sible for a fundamentalist group to be 
skeptical and critical of the world, and of 
secular authority. If the world is not per-
fectible without a major upheaval, than 
progress is illusory. This fits with anal-
ready existing dissatisfaction with the 
world among fundamentalists. 
P ostmillennialism on the other hand, 
is rare among fundamentalist movements. 
Postmillennialism postulates that the 
world is past the millennium and that we 
are living in the new age, or to paraphrase 
Voltaire's Dr. Pangloss, 'the best of all 
possible worlds'. Postmillennialism thus, 
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world affinning, affinns the authority of 
the broader society. 
During the middle ages, Judaism as a 
whole was premillennialist and Christian-
ity as a whole was postmillennialist. The 
Church considered itself to be the new Is-
rael, the Kingdom of G-d, Christendom, 
deriving its authority in the new age 
which allegedly began with the birth of 
Christ from the apostolic succession from 
Peter. The Second Coming was consid-
ered to be an event far in the future (al-
though there was a great deal of 
theological speculation at around 1000 
A.D.). Righteousness was vested in and 
in obedience to, an already existing 
authority structure, the Church, from 
whom even the State derived ultimate 
authority. 
Judaism on the other hand, theologi-
cally denied the validity of Jesus Christ. 
Judaism maintained a theologically pre-
millennia! stance, emphasising the unde-
sirability of galut, of exile, and praying 
for redemption from exile and the coming 
of Moshiach. The gentile world was not 
desirable, and gentile authority was not 
only illegitimate, but often downright hos-
tile. Judaism thus tpaintained a world de-
nying premillennial stance. 
During the 17th Century, Judaism.was 
rocked by the episode of the false mes-
siah, Sabbatai Sevi. Attracting a large fol-
lowing, his movement took a 
postmillennial stance, claiming that since 
the messianic age had dawned, the exist-
ing Torah was to be replaced by a new, 
higher Torah, the 'Torah of Atzilut'. Al-
though he was discredited in the eyes of 
most Jews following his acceptance of Is-
lam as an alternative to execution, he 
maintained an underground following and 
his movement had profound effects on Ju-
daism that has persisted to the present 
day. Most obviously, it left the main-
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stream of Orthodox Judaism hypervigi-
lant when it came to the issue of innova-
tions withing Judaism. New movements 
within Judaism, whether the Chassidism 
of the Baal Shem Tov in Eastern Europe, 
or the Kabbalism of Moses Chaim Luz-
zato had to run the gauntlet of opposition 
from rabbinic authorities who feared the 
rise of another Sabbatai Sevi. This vigi-
lance was not necessarily misplaced, be-
cause Sabbataian movements, particularly 
that of Jacob Frank were quite active at 
the time, and continued to preach the doc-
trine of revolution against the law of To-
rah. 
It is still a contentious issue whether 
followers of Jacob Frank played a major 
role in the initial development of Reform 
Judaism, following the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic War as Gershom 
Scholem has alleged. What is beyond con-
tention is that Judaism developed postmil-
lennial offshoots at the same time that 
some Protestant sects began espousing 
premillennialist doctrines. During the 
1820s, Abraham Geiger developed aRe-
form Jewish theology that was postmillen-
nial in nature. It denied the validity of the 
Moshiach concept, claiming that the 
world would gradually (or was gradually) 
evolving into a messianic age. The idea of 
the rebuilding of the temple and the resto-
ration of its sacrifices was denied. The 
adopting of the title of temple by Reform 
Jewish congregations was part of this de-
nial. Laws such as sabbath and Kashruth 
were considered to be outmoded, a prod-
uct of the previous unenlightened age. 
The Reform and Liberal movement in Ju-
daism thus moved from the traditional 
world denying stance of Judaism to one 
of world affirmation, and was at least im-
plicitly, postmillennialist. 
At the same time Abraham Geiger was 
developing Reform Judaism in Germany, 
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a Scottish preacher named John Nelson 
Darby, founder of a sect called the Ply-
mouth Brethren, was promulgating a pre-
millennialist theology among protestant 
Christians. Darby emphasised the Chris-
tian Book of Revelations, which although 
it had been accepted into the Christian 
canon was little studied. He postulated 
that the world would end in a cataclysm 
known as the Great Tribulation, in which 
the antichrist would reign for 14 years, to 
be followed by the return of Christ. Some-
where during this time (most premillenni-
alistftwndamentalistChristians 
optimistically believe immediately before 
the Great Tribulation), faithful Christians 
would be caught up or raptured into 
heaven. Darbyism thus is an essentially 
world denying view of Christianity. 
Darby's beliefs never caught on to a 
great degree in Great Britain. But during 
the course of the 19th Century, they be-
came popular in the United States. This 
was partially the result of Thomas 
Schofield, a conservative protestant theo-
logian in the United States, who devised a 
concise means of studying the bible. His 
Schofield reference bibles were easily 
read and studied and came to dominate 
conservative American Christianity at a 
time when the more dominant liberal tra-
ditions were appealing only to people of 
higher socio-economic status. 
By the 1920s, when the ftwndamental-
ist-modemist debates began to polarise 
American religious opinion, the Schofield 
Reference Bible was already entrenched, 
and premillennialism the dominant millen-
Dial belief among American ftwndamental-
ist Christians. 
At this time, the United States had de-
veloped a reputation as a wasteland for 
Orthodox Judaism. Over the course of the 
19th Century, a pattern had developed, 
noted by Sklar and others, of pioneer 
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Jews coming to the United States (and 
Australia) tending to be the poorer, less 
educated, and more alienated members of 
the Jewish community. Finding them-
selves in an alien land with little prejudice 
against Jews, but with few Jews with 
which to build communal institutions and 
reinforce religiosity, they quickly learned 
to attenuate their religious observances in 
the interest of survival and prosperity. 
The arrival of the pioneer Eastern Euro-
pean Jews in the US in the 1860s and 
1870s and the first major wave of Russian 
Jews in the early 1880s fits this pattern. 
By the time that more solid members of 
the Jewish community arrived, often dis-
lodged by persecution, as the second ma-
jor wave of Jewish immigration was in 
the early 1900s, their friends and neigh-
bours who had left earlier had made their 
adjustments to American (and British and 
Australian and South African) secular so-
ciety, and were in a position to act as role 
models for their 'greenhorn' relatives 
who would often be in need of their finan-
cial assistance. Secularity thus became 
the norm in the new Jewish communities, 
aided and abetted by secularising move-
ments from Haskalah to Bundism to Com-
munism to Zionism that were sweeping 
Eastern Europe during the .fin de siecle. 
Religious observance soon faltered in an 
environment in which if one did not work 
on Saturday, one would not have a job on 
the following Monday, even if one 
worked for a Jew. Moreover, Reform Ju-
daism flourished in the United States as it 
was readily able to accommodate itself to 
the secular and postmillennial reality that 
at the time was not only dominant, but su-
preme in the United States in which relig-
ion was either regarded as a strictly 
private matter, or else was seen as a guide 
for social action, following the lead of the 
Social Gospel Movement, then coming 
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into ascendancy. The established Ortho-
dox Jewish communities in Eastern 
Europe, following a pattern established 
during the early 19th Century of avoiding 
the dilemmas of emancipation by declin-
ing emancipation, initially wrote off mi-
gration (and migrants) to America (and 
Australia was unheard of) as a religious 
death sentence. This created a self fulfill-
ing prophecy in which the United States 
received the worst of Europe's new rabbis 
and the least of its scholarship. Religious 
Jews were encouraged to remain in 
Europe if at all possible. 
Nevertheless, such were the forces 
sweeping Europe that remaining in 
Europe was often not an option after 
World War I. The war dislodged many 
Jewish communities in Poland and Rus-
sia, and the Communist persecution of re-
ligious observance, often with secularised 
Bolshevik Jews in the vanguard, made the 
restoration of the shtetl communities not 
an option, particularly in those parts of 
Russia that were part of the new USSR. 
Although many attempted to settle in still 
non-communist parts of Eastern Europe 
(and some, particularly the Lubavitch 
communities attempted to carry on Ortho-
r 
dox observance illegally within the 
USSR), the United States began to be 
seen as more of a viable option for Ortho-
dox communities. Orthodox Jews began 
to immigrate to the United States for the 
first time with the intent of reestablishing 
communities on American soil between 
1917 and 1921, when new, ethnically 
based immigration restrictions largely cur-
tailed this movement. It was enough, how-
ever, to begin the establishment of a 
religious infrastructure that could be built 
upon after the Second World War, when 
surviving communities could find refuge 
in the United States. 
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The first generation of Orthodox Jews 
in the United States, who arrived before 
World War II, and the second generation 
who arrived immediately after the war, 
tended to shun university education as a 
path to assimilation, relying instead on 
small businesses, and sometimes on par-
ticular niches, such as the diamond indus-
try in New York City. This was a pattern 
that did not begin to be broken until the 
1960s. As a result, Orthodox Jews tended 
to be less educated, and have lower in-
come than less religious, more assimi-
latedJews. 
This marginalisation was reinforced 
by events occurring in what was then Pal-
estine. Although religious Jews had been 
the first Jews to return to the Land of Is-
rael, beginning in the 18th Century, they 
for the most part had been content to 
study Torah and live on alms sent from 
Europe. The arrival of idealistic, aggres-
sively secular and socialist Jews who 
made up the Zionist movement horrified 
them. They quickly came to oppose the 
Zionist movement as a violation of a con-
tract made with the gentile nations in 
which Jews would not attempt to over-
throw gentile authority and rebuild the 
temple and the gentiles would not perse-
cute the Jews 'ovennuch'. The creation of 
the State of Israel, they saw as an abomi-
nation and something that should not 
even be contemplated until the coming of 
Moshiach. Attempts to create a central re-
ligious authority in the 1920s were met by 
hostility and boycott, although a Chief 
Rabbinate for Israel was established un-
der the leadership of Rabbi Avraham 
Kook. Rav Kook established a theology 
of religious zionism that while still is 
largely marginal to most hard core Ortho-
dox Jews, helped bridge the gap between 
Orthodoxy and Zionism and in many 
ways, made Orthodox Judaism more ap-
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proachable to many non-religious Jews 
who returned to Orthodoxy in the Baalei 
Teshuvah Movement of the 1970s. 
Despite the objections of the then 
mainstream of Orthodox Judaism, the 
State of Israel was established, and with 
the exception of the Neturah Kartah 
movement and the Satmar Chassidim, the 
State of Israel won a grudging acceptance 
as a fait accompli among most Orthodox 
Jews, although the idea of a secular non-
obsetvant state governing Israel still pro-
vokes anger among them. 
The unwillingness of Orthodox Jews 
to fully accept the Jewish state was one of 
the factors marginalising them until the 
1970s. 
It was a result of the social turmoil of 
the 1960s that fundamentalism, Christian 
and Jewish, escaped from marginalisa-
tion. Indeed the ethos of the 1960s has 
tended to delegitimate the entire notion of 
marginalisation. The 1950s had been 
marked by both a high degree of material 
progress and a high degree of conformity 
and social structure. Vance Packard, in 
his work The Status Seekers details how 
religious behaviour as well as income, 
tended to be determined by status. 
Quite probably the United States was 
suffering from fatigue as a result of 35 
years of continuous mobilisation to cope 
with the Great Depression, the Nazi men-
ace, and Communism. Certainly liberal 
Jews played a major role in the destabilis-
ing effects of the 1960s. After all, the 
postwar American Civil Rights Move-
ment was a coalition between African-
Americans and Jews, aimed at 
eliminating prejudice once and for all as a 
factor in American life, in order to make 
another holocaust impossible and elimi-
nate the last racial and religious barriers 
to full participation by both black Ameri-
cans and Jews in American professional 
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and public life. The values created by the 
Civil Rights Movement, however, inter-
acted with the rebellion against religious 
and social conformity that began with the 
Beats in the 1950s, and culminated in the 
hippies of the 1960s. By the beginnings 
of the 1970s, in the course of their aliena-
tion and religious quests, a fair number of 
hippies (some of them gentile converts) 
had begun to find their way back to Ortho-
dox Judaism and particularly Chassidic 
Judaism, just as hippies were finding their 
way to fundamentalist Christianity via the 
Jesus Movement. In both cases, the com-
bination of premillennialism, which im-
plied a critique of modem society, 
pentecostal enthusiasm, and personal pu-
rity, tended to meet hippie's model of the 
world and to provide them with a way of 
reintegrating with society and finding 
one's way in it as an adult, without surren-
dering to it. · 
Orthodox rabbis such as Rabbi 
Shlomo Carlbach of San Francisco, the 
Homeshteipler Rebbe, Rabbi Shloime 
Twerski of Denver, the·Lubavitcher 
Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel 
Schneersohn of New York, and the Bos-
toner Rebbe, Rabbi Horowitz, began to 
appeal to Orthodox Jews in the United 
States. In Israel, during the 1970s, rabbis 
such as Rabbi Noach Weinberg of Aish 
Hatorah Yeshivah and Rabbi Goldstein of 
the Diaspora Yeshivah, began to appeal to 
Baalei Teshuvah, educated young people. 
These Israeli baalei teshuvah yeshivot 
were not Chassidic and tended to be part 
of the Mitnagid yeshiva movement. As 
such, they quickly broadened the baalei 
teshuvah movement to include Mit-
nagidim (former opponents of the Chas-
sidic/ movement) as well as Chassidim 
thus avoiding a possible cleavage on 
Chassidic-Mitnagid lines. They were 
joined by religious zionists led by Rabbi 
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Moshe Levinger of the Gush Emunim, a 
movement specialising in settling in the 
occupied territories, and the even more 
militant Rabbi Meir Kahane, an expatriate 
American rabbi whose Jewish Defence 
League brought a new muscularity to or-
thodox Judaism in the United States. 
The espousing of fundamentalist Juda-
ism by college educated Jews of higher 
socioeconomic backgrounds has tended to 
break down the marginalisation of Ortho-
dox Judaism, just as a similar phenome-
non has occurred in fundamentalist 
Christianity. Jewish fundamentalism has 
come to display a new self confidence 
based on a proven ability to attract edu-
cated and well-to-do people to religious 
observance. A college education is no 
longer universally feared as religious 
death. Although baalei teshuvim still tend 
to be snubbed in marriage by Orthodox 
from birth families, this difference ap-
pears to disappear in the second genera-
tion. 
The spectrum of Orthodox Judaism is 
wide. It includes the Discovery Work-
shop, a workshop by Yeshivah Aish Ha-
torah whose major thrust is the proving of 
divine authorship of an inerrant Torah 
through the discoVery of codes in the To-
rah (Pentateuch only) that are only dis-
cernible by computer, and are held to be 
statistically impossibly there by accident. 
It includes a wide range of shabbatonim, 
sabbath workshops aimed at acquainting 
people with torah observance. 
One area of Jewish fundamentalism 
that has attracted a great deal of attention 
lately, particularly in Australia, is a grow-
ing fascination with prophecy and escha-
tology (end time speculation), particularly 
among Lubavitch chassidim. This specula-
tion has been greatly aided by the momen-
tous events of 1989, 1990, and 1991, 
which has been so momentous that it has 
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inevitably resulted in messianic specula-
tion. 
During the period immediate! y prior to 
1989, Israel had been going through ape-
riod of self doubt and self reflection 
caused by a combination of economic dif-
ficulties and the limited success of the 
1982 Operation Peace For Galilee. This 
became even more apparent with the 
launching of the Intifada. The splits be-
tween the nonzionist or antizionist 
· charedi wings of orthodoxy and the na-
tionalist Kach and Gush Emunim move-
ments became even more rancorous than 
they already were. All of this changed to 
a degree with the release of Soviet Jews 
by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989. In place 
of a stark and apocalyptic choice between 
territorial compromise, eventual demo-
graphic submergence by a rising Arab 
birthrate, and expulsion of Arab popula-
tions advocated by Rabbi Meir Kahane, 
the rising tide of Russian Jews provided 
some breathing room, if they could be 
successfully absorbed. In the face of these 
new possibilities, a new optimism 
emerged. This became even more appar-
ent during the period of the Gulf War, in 
which the Lubavitch Chassidic Move-
ment discovered a prophecy in Yalkut 
Shemoni, a commentary on the prophets, 
which appeared to link the Gulf War situ-
ation with the coming of Moshiach. The 
coincidental (or providential) juxtaposi-
tion of the start of the crisis with 
Tish'b' Av, the start of the ground war 
with Shabbat Zachor, and the defeat of 
Iraq and ceasefire with the onset of Purim 
created an expectation of the coming of 
Moshiach in Lubavitch that was reinforce 
by the death of the old USSR and its re-
placement by a commonwealth of its for-
merly constituent republics. Lubavitch 
had been steadily moving in the direction 
of declaring that the Moshiach is on the 
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earth ever since the Lubavitcher Reb be's 
famous speech ofNissan 26,5751 in 
which he declared that he had done all 
that he could to bring Moshiach and that 
the rest was up to his followers. By No-
vember of 1991, the Lubavitcher Rebbe 
was exhorting Jews to "open their eyes 
and see" that Moshiach was on this earth, 
and that all that was necessary was for 
people to realise the fact. 
Nevertheless, Lubavitch had and has 
made it quite clear that it will continue to 
hold to a premillennialist line until the 
Temple is standing in its place. Lubavitch 
continues to adhere quite closely to the 
Maimonidean (hi/chat malkut) definitions 
of the coming of Moshiach which hold 
that while a candidate may probably be 
considered Moshiach if he emerges from 
the House of David (many Chassidic Reb-
bes claim descent from the House of 
David through descent from Rashi), com-
pel all of Israel to follow the laws of To-
rah and fight the wars of G-d (which 
Lubavitchers take to mean against assimi-
lation), he can be considered to be 
Moshiach. Miracles, according to this con-
ception are not necessary and Lubavitch-
ers make much of the fact that Rabbi 
Akiva held Bar Koziba (Bar Kochba) to 
be the Messianic king even though he ulti-
mately failed. Bar Koziba is held to be a 
failed messiah rather than a false messiah. 
Just how much support messianism 
will or will not command outside of 
Lubavitch remains to be seen. Yet it is sig-
nificant that the Lubavitcher Rebbe can 
raise this issue in the manner that he has 
without being condemned out of hand (at 
least as of the time of this publication) by 
the rest of Orthodoxy as a latter day Sab-
batai Sevi. This is an indication that the 
messianic idea has a great deal of life in it 
within Jewish fundamentalism and re-
mains an idea commanding a great deal 
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of respect and fascination among Ortho-
dox Jewish fundamentalists. The Mai-
monidean conception of Moshiach 
emphasises the difference between 
Moshiach coming 'in its time', 'like a 
thief by night' i.e. through natural means, 
and 'before its time', 'on the clouds', if 
Jews merit it,. i.e. through undisputed mir-
acles. Orthodox Jews pray that Moshiach 
come before its time, in a manner that is 
undisputable. This would obviously avoid 
the chance that one might be following a 
false messiah! 
Current events have raised the fascina-
tion with Moshiach to such a level, how-
ever, that to close the door on any 
messianism that does not involve obvious 
violations of the laws of nature (viola-
tions which can also be faked) threaten to 
invalidate the entire concept. To in effect 
treat the coming of Moshiach as some-
thing that must always recede into the fu-
ture is to express disbelief in the entire 
concept of Moshiach, which is one of the 
fundamental tenets of Judaism. For Ortho-
dox Jews to do this would inevitably re-
sult in a failure of nerve which has been 
fatal to other religions in the past. This at 
all costs, Jewish Orthodox fundamental-
ism must avoid. It might be better in such 
circumstances to join a messianic bid that 
might fail than to attempt to falsify and 
thwart such a bid. A failed messiah at this 
point in history might actually be easier to 
live with than a false messiah. And there 
is always the chance that given the fact 
that there is a sovereign Jewish state for 
the first time since Bar Koziba, such a bid 
might actually succeed, even though the 
mainstream of Christianity and Islam (to 
say nothing of liberal Judaism) might 
have vested interests in its failure. 
Jewish fundamentalism is a movement 
which has risen from marginality at the 
same time and for much the same rea-
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sons, as Christian fundamentalism. It is a 
vibrant and dynamic movement. Refonn 
Judaism has been making concessions in 
the area of patrilineality of Jewish descent 
that sets it at odds with the rest of Juda-
ism and may yet force a schism. Conser-
vative Judaism (and liberal orthodox) is 
suffering attrition from low birthrates, as-
similation and intennarriage, particularly 
in the United States. But Orthodoxy has 
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maintained a high birthrate (higher than 
any fundamentalist Christian denomina-
tion in the U.S.) and an integrated social 
system that has enabled it to both retain 
its members and attract new members 
from the rest of Judaism. Unless the risks 
of the messianic course prove to be its un-
doing it seems set to become the domi-
nant force within Judaism in the next 
century. 
Book Review 
Rescuing the Bible from 
Fundamentalism: A Bishop Rethinks 
the Meaning of Scripture 
John Shelby Spong 
Harper, San Francisco. 1991 
ISBN 0-06-067509-8, 267pp. $14.95 
Bishop John has understandably faced 
criticism from Christian fundamentalists 
and confessional conservatives because of 
his demythologising of the Bible and, on 
the other hand, academic free-thinkers are 
not sure about his crusade to remytholo- · 
gise the Bible (:237). The author realises 
that his quest to journey far more deeply 
into the meaning/of biblical truth is more 
than either fundamentalists or liberals 
seem willing to do (:88). 
However, for increasing numbers of 
spiritual seekers, Bishop Spong's under-
standing and use of the Bible makes 
much sense as he follows the usual henne-
neutical stages of description, evaluation 
and application of the text. 
1. He honestly studies and tries to un-
derstand the text as it was literally in-
tended by the author within his or her 
original context. 
2. He then pursues the liberal, schol-
arly aims of higher-critically evaluating 
the text, its date, its author, its sources, 
and other relevant data in order to estab-
lish what is factual and empirical history, 
geography and cosmology, and what is 
poetic, figurative, symbolic narrative, my-
thology and theology. 
3. He then applies the life enhancing 
features of both its history and mythology 
anagogically to present life situations and 
to deeper human experiences where love, 
life, experiences of God, and issues in liv-
ing are explored and appropriated. 
Along with this henneneutical ap-
proach, Spong sees the need to acknow-
ledge the subjective and relative character 
of human endeavours (:232), to acknow-
ledge that our scientific categories and re-
alities no longer include supernatural 
categories (:236), and that in a choice, 
truth needs to come before orthodoxy. 
The contents simply follow an intellec-
tual and spiritual journey through the 
whole Bible. This includes the Hebrew ac-
count of creation and the Flood, Abra-
ham's settlement in Palestine, the Hebrew 
slavery in Egypt, activities of the Proph-
ets, protesters like Job, Ruth and Jonah, 
the emergence of Christianity, the apostle 
Paul's contribution, the gospels of Mark, 
Matthew, Luke and John, Christmas and 
Easter, and who Christ is for people today. 
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There are many insights in this book 
which can assist in an appreciation of the 
Bible's original contexts, an honest 
higher-critical evaluation, and a spiritu-
ally satisfying application of both the fac-
tual surface and the deeper spiritual and 
symbolic truths of the Bible. 
The author clearly acknowledges that 
there are concepts in the Bible which are 
repugnant to modem consciousness, in-
cluding the deity's sadistic delight in kill-
ing the firstborn of every Egyptian 
'household (:16). 
He holds that claims of infallibility 
and inerrancy result in religious imperial-
ism (:19), that the Bible is clearly not a 
scientific textbook (:25), that the earth is 
not flat (:26), that our earth is between 
four and five billion years old (:32), that 
life came into existence about three and a 
half billion years ago in the sea and 
moved onto the land about 450 million 
years ago (:38), and that a universal flood 
that covered the whole earth to the depth 
of fifteen cubits is not a fact in history but 
exists only in our mythology. 
Bishop Spong is happy to affinn some 
of the values which the biblical writers af-
finned (:33) but he sees the need to inter-
pret our world in the light of our present 
knowledge and suppositions. 
The familiar source theory of JEDP is 
used to make sense out of the composi-
tion of the Pentateuch (:43-55); Job, Ruth 
and Jonah are seen by the author as liter-
ary creations, not as persons in history 
(:64); the messianic thought is seen to be 
corporate rather than individual for the 
Jews (:65); and the Scriptures are seen as 
acculturated stories of a specific people 
who capture in their remembered history 
archetypal and eternal truths which we 
can still experience, enter and live, even 
today (:75). 
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However, although seeing the Bible as 
not literally true in a thousand details, the 
Bishop affirms that it does 'touch the 
deep wells of truth' (:86). 
A critical approach towards the New 
Testament clearly touches conservative 
Christian nerves so the author devotes 
pages 77 to 244 to the early Christian writ-
ings. 
Attention is drawn to the very early 
Aramaic and Jewish Christian stages of 
development in the Jesus traditions before 
the later Gentile stage now familiar in the 
writings of Paul and in the Gospels (:86). 
The author sees Paul as a man of his 
times, whose attitudes were part of the 
widespread patriarchal system then but by 
modem standards are wrong. These 
wrong attitudes include especially the sub-
ordinate role of women and the institution 
of slavery (:101). In Spong's vie-w 'it is 
the height of foolishness to try to claim 
eternal truth for Paul's culturally condi-
tioned and time limited words' (:104). 
The Gospels clearly cause problems as 
the gospel writers explain and mould the 
Jesus of history (:143) within their own 
context. Mark stressed Jesus' role as the 
Messiah both political and spiritual. In re-
gard to Matthew, his zeal was greater 
than his research, resulting in disastrous 
biblical scholarship (:149) but his use of 
Messianic references in the Hebrew Scrip-
tures, the use of the Pentateuch as a 
model for the five sections of his Gospel 
(:160) and his stress on Jesus as fulfilling 
the role of Moses and the Law had a 
strong appeal to Jews and Jewish Chris-
tians. Luke stressed the role of the 
prophet Elijah (: 179) and John stressed 
the view· of Jesus as the pre-existent Wis-
dom or Logos. 
Comments on Christmas and Easter 
lead once again to the Bishop's emphasis 
on separating 'experience from narration' 
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(:222) so that historical fact and mytho-
logical fiction can be distinguished and 
both used spiritually for our journey 
through life. 
The Bishop clearly indicates that he 
expects heated criticism from the ex-
tremes of fundamentalists, who crave for 
emotional security and religious certainty 
rather than the doubts of honesty, and 
from those addicted to free-thinking, shal-
low, 'empty, post-modem secularity', liv-
ing in their carefully constructed spiritual 
vacuums (:134). 
Somewhere in between the Bishop ad-
vises spiritual seekers to extract the 'es-
sence of Christian truth ... from the 
phenomenalistic framework of the ancient 
past' (:134). 
I appreciated very much this book's 
challenges to the status quo and its at-
tempt to establish an authentic, realistic, 
honest and up-to-date spirituality for our 
present age. 
You can also test your reactions to 
these ideas by reading this remarkable 
best -selling book about the Bible. 
John Noack 
Trini~ Grammar School, Kew. 
Blood of the Sword, Blood of the Cross 
Reza F. Safa, Bromley, U.K., Sovereign 
World/STL Books, 1990. 107pp. Soft-
cover, £2.95 
This book immediately arouses curios-
ity by identifying itself as the testimony 
of a charismatic evangelical Christian 
who has taken the little-travelled path of 
converting from a fundamentalist Muslim 
background. 
The first chapter sets the scene: a vivid 
encapsulation of the author's childhood in 
a large Iranian family, with an authoritar-
ian and at times violent father whom he 
grows to dislike greatly, and a realisation 
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on the part of the author that his own me-
ticulous adherence to the laws and com-
mandments of Islam, and the resulting 
recognition of his righteousness by those 
who know him, has left a feeling a dissat-
isfaction on his part, and a feeling of 'a 
lack of peace and joy in my heart' (p11). 
This is reinforced by the observation that 
his father's 'rebirth' as a devout Muslim 
has meant a change in his outward prac-
tices only- his father's inward character 
has remained the same. 
On attaining adulthood, the author 
leaves Iran to undertake studies in the 
USA. With the Iranian revolution a year 
later, the author returns during the vaca-
tion to Iran, disillusioned with the US and 
holding utopian expectations of the Is-
lamic revolution in his home country. He 
is quickly disillusioned even further by 
the bitterness and hatred he finds being 
mutually expressed by the forces compet-
ing for dominance in the chaos of post-
revolutionary Iran. He tries to fill the void 
he is experiencing by becoming engaged 
to a relative, but this has little effect, and 
he leaves Iran for a second time, this time 
for Sweden. 
In Sweden, the author has his first sub-
stantial debate with a Christian, in the per-
son of a young American woman. In this 
debate, the author presents the standard 
litany of Muslim criticisms of Christian-
ity: the blasphemy of calling Jesus 'the 
son of God'; the supremacy and finality 
of the Qur' an as divinely revealed scrip-
ture over the earlier revelations to Adam, 
Noah, Moses (the Torah) and Jesus (the 
Gospels), each of which Muslims believe 
were distorted and changed by the Jews 
and Christians; the Muslim belief that it 
was not Jesus who was crucified, but a 
look-alike. 
The author is intrigued to continue the 
Christian-Muslim dialogue when the op-
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portunity reappears, and he actively seeks 
out further interfaith dialogue, by walking 
into a cathedral and offering to do clean-
ing in exchange for lessons about Christi.:. 
anity. This leads him to two Swedish 
evangelicals, whose testimonies and influ-
ence provide the impetus for the author to 
decide to convert to Christianity. In tak-
ing this step, he lists a revealing set of 
contrasts between the practice of Chris-
tian faith of the two Swedes and the prac-(\_ 
tice of his own Muslim faith. The author 
contrasts the Bible reading and spontane-
ous Christian prayer in the mother 
tongues of Christians with the reading of 
the Qur' an and rote prayer in Arabic, a 
foreign language for the majority of the 
world's muslims. The author also refers 
to the forgiveness, care and compassion 
for others, the renunciation of hatred and 
bitterness, and the avoidance of back -bit-
ing and lying among his Christian friends 
as against contrasting. behaviour among 
the Muslim society which he has left be-
hind. 
Though disinherited and ostracised by 
his family because of his conversion, the 
author proceeds to devote himself to wit-
nessing and preaching among the Muslim 
Iranian refugee community living in 
Spain. He meets and marries an American 
Christian, and they also preach in other 
European centres, including Communist 
Romania prior to the fall of Ceaucescu, 
where Christian worship was severely cir-
cumscribed. A partial reconciliation with 
his family occurs when he is visited by 
his sister and mother, who are relieved to 
see that he is not insane as they had sus-
pected. This reconciliation is confirmed 
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by a meeting with his father in Singapore, 
where his father tells him he is the lucki-
est member of their family as he is clearly 
the happiest and most fu1filled. 
This book promises much because of 
the background of the author and his evi-
dent commitment to his new faith. This 
promise is not totally fulfilled, because 
the book is really a personal account of 
conversion and, in fact, essentially an 
autobiography. Much more could have 
been made of the Christian-Muslim di-
vide, and how the author reconciled the 
two. He could have focused more on the 
Muslim context, by indicating why Chris-
tian missionary work faces such enor-
mous difficulties. Moreover, in 
concluding the work by reiterating that 
good works and 'religion' do not lead to 
salvation, the author could have elabo-
rated much more on the degree to which 
he views liturgical practice, good works, 
and laws and commandments as provid-
ing the cornerstones of the practice of Is-
lam, through which he himself had · 
experienced little more than an 'empty 
void'. 
Nevertheless, readers who are inter-
ested in Muslim -Christian dialogue and 
debate should read this book. It is one of 
few personal testimonies written by for-
mer Muslims who have converted to 
Christianity, and as such, it provides an 
important insight into the dynamics of 
this dialogue. 
Peter Riddell 
South & West Asia Centre 
Australian National Unil!ersity 
